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Abstract 
This paper delves into some of the major inconveniences 
caused to the parties engaging in arbitration and seeks to 
analyze the causes of guerrilla tactics in particular, in 
order to devise the necessary framework required to 
control it. Arbitration for dispute resolution has become 
prominent in the recent times. However, a number of 
leading arbitrators and practitioners have described the 
continuing lack of ethical regulation as a potential crisis 
that threatens the legitimacy of international arbitration. 
This paper looks at how arbitration can be developed as a 
means of dispute resolution by providing a level playing 
field to its parties, thereby restoring its lost credibility. 
The paper also highlights the need to have an 
internationally approved code of conduct like the recent 
International Bar Association (IBA) guidelines, to curb 
guerrilla tactics in international arbitration. 
Keywords: Arbitration Proceedings, Guerrilla Tactics, International 
Arbitration, Regulatory Mechanisms, State Court Interventions 
Introduction 
Guerrilla tactics in arbitration continues to be an exception to the 
conventional means of conducting arbitration proceedings. 
Arbitrations are often high stake adjudications requiring immense 
procedural sensitivity. Parties expend exorbitant amount of 
resources on arbitrations expecting, at the very least, a level playing 
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field. But the guerrillas of modern arbitrations hinder this. Hence, 
the lack of ethical norms in adjudication is becoming blatant in this 
method of dispute resolution as well. The subject matter of this 
paper involves matters concerning state court interventions which 
are inimical to the arbitral process, particularly such interventions 
brought about at the behest of a state which is a party to the 
arbitration. The author in this article seeks to examine the concept 
of guerrillas in arbitration, the issues involved and the mechanisms 
regulating the same. 
Every generation has seen deviations either from the traditional 
social norms or prescribed laws of the land. One instance of such a 
deviation i.e. guerrilla warfare/tactics was the Scythian’s swift 
attacks and equally prompt retreats which expelled the invading 
Persian troops of Darius I in 512 B.C.1 An interesting proponent of 
such tactics is ‘Attila the Hun’; who was known and feared for his 
ruthless war manoeuvres which consisted of ‘fury, surprise, 
elusiveness, cunning nature and mobility’.2 Thereafter, this has 
been a consistent phenomenon that has found its way through 
history. Contemporary guerrillas include the guerrilla wars waged 
by African liberation movements seeking independence, such as in 
Algeria and Eritrea.3 Their objectives, however, have often differed, 
ranging from an ideology to an unanswered grievance. 
The concept as it stands today has been filtered through positive 
assertions and approaches. The lasting impact has been the result 
of audacious approaches, against all odds, corresponding with Mao 
Tse-Tung’s assertion that ‘all guerrilla units start from nothing and 
                                                          
1 ANTHONY JAMES JOES, GUERRILLA WARFARE 3 (Robin 
Highamed.,Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996). 
2 JOHN FREDERICK CHARLES FULLER, A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WESTERN 
WORLD: FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE BATTLE OF LEPANTO VOL. I 288 
(Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 1987). 
3 Christopher Clapham, Introduction: Analyzing African Insurgencies, in 
AFRICAN GUERRILLAS 2(Christopher Clapham ed., Oxford: James Currey, 
1998); David Pool, The Eritrean People's Liberation Front, in AFRICAN 
GUERRILLAS 19 (Christopher Clapham ed., Oxford: James Currey, 1998). 
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grow’4 and Ernesto ‘Ché’ Guevara’s ‘inevitable conclusion that the 
guerrilla fighter is a social reformer […] responding to the angry 
protest of the people against their oppressors’.5 From a fight to gain 
social acceptability, this term has now obtained a marketable 
appeal. Most notably, the single photograph by Alberto Korda from 
1960, which has been reproduced on millions of T shirts and 
posters ever since, and has immortalized the ‘guerrilla’ as popular 
culture icon. Enjoying such a rich historical heritage, the term 
guerrilla is nowadays increasingly employed in a fashionable 
manner, labelling unconventional methods in myriad disciplines, 
ranging from ‘guerrilla gardening’ to ‘guerrilla marketing’.6 
The romanticisation of such tactics has encouraged the guerrillas to 
a great extent. In turn, they have reduced international processes, 
including international arbitration, to a game of mere one-
upmanship. The truth about such tactics was unveiled to a large 
extent during the peninsular war, where the Spanish guerrillas 
caused ‘scenes of [....] utmost cruelty’ evinced by ‘reports of men 
being stoned to death, boiled in oil, sawn in half or buried up to 
their necks in the ground and left to die of thirst’.7 Likewise, Ché’s 
casual diary entry, describing his execution of a peasant and traitor 
demonstrates that guerrilla warfare is not to be mistaken with civil 
disobedience. 
The Concept of Arbitration 
Arbitration is a private system of adjudication. The intention of the 
parties is to resolve their dispute outside the boundaries of the 
existing judicial system. Generally, arbitration proceedings are 
                                                          
4 MAO TSE-TUNG, ON GUERRILLA WARFARE 96 (Samuel B. Griffith II trans. 
Champaign: Illinois University Press, 1961). 
5 CHÉ GUEVARA, GUERRILLA WARFARE 10 (New York : Monthly Review 
Press 1961). 
6 RICHARD REYNOLDS, ON GUERRILLA GARDENING (London : Bloomsbury, 
2008); JAY CONRAD LEVINSON, GUERRILLA MARKETING (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Books, 2007). 
7 CHARLES J. ESDAILE, FIGHTING NAPOLEON – GUERRILLAS, BANDITS AND 
ADVENTURES IN SPAIN, 1808-1814, 31(New Haven : Yale University Press, 
2004). 
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followed by an award i.e. a final and binding decision enforceable 
in a court of law.The arbitrators (judges) are usually one or three in 
number or and are chosen by the parties. There are two 
mechanisms that can be adopted in arbitration. The first is 
institutional arbitration which involves specific institutions 
dedicated to Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) and the other 
being ad hoc arbitration, without any institutional involvement. 
The applicable rules are those of the arbitral institution, or 
alternatively other rules chosen by the parties. In addition to 
choosing the arbitrators and the rules, parties may also choose the 
place of arbitration and the language of arbitration. 
Arbitration is preferred over domestic litigation primarily because 
of party autonomy. Arbitration gives the parties substantial 
autonomy and control over the process that will be used to resolve 
their disputes. This is important because there is always an 
apprehension, of the other party’s ‘home court advantage’. 
Arbitration offers a more neutral forum, wherein each side believes 
that they will have a fair hearing. 
An important question to be considered at this juncture pertains to 
how guerrilla tactics relate to other tactics in international 
arbitration. However, a practical approach to international 
arbitration tells a different story. During the initial years, 
arbitration was a rather elite affair, confined to a few professionals. 
The ethical problems and conflicts, then, were limited to the cosy 
confines of the fraternity because their individual reputations were 
at stake. However, with the forces of globalization fuelling the 
explosive growth in international arbitration over the last several 
decades, the number of players at the international arbitral table 
has increased beyond what could have been reasonably expected. 
This has largely been a boon to the efficient, judicious and fair 
resolution of international commercial disputes. However, several 
issues have arisen in respect of the ‘ethical’ behaviour in the 
conduct of such arbitrations. 
The success of arbitration, irrespective of the strength of the legal 
claim, lies in a counsel’s ability to present his case. Here is where 
the concept of guerrilla tactics arises. While arguing, a party has 
two options available i.e. either to win or to make the other party 
lose. The former is an ethical approach generally deployed by the 
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party with a stronger case. In such cases, presenting one’s case 
involves a favourable representation of facts and substantive 
arguments which form a legal basis for such arguments. The latter, 
however, generally foregoes the ethical lines and thus employs the 
tactics of the ‘little war’.8 These tactics are generally deployed by a 
party incapable of presenting a strong case which includes tactics 
like attempting to avoid or delay theupfront legal confrontation by 
gradually, deceitfully and viciously wearing down the other party, 
the opposing counsel, or the arbitral tribunal. These are the patent 
forms of guerrilla tactics in international arbitration. This approach 
basically intends to undermine the mechanisms envisaged in the 
conventional arbitration. A survey on this topic revealed that fifty 
five out of eighty one international arbitration practitioners had 
witnessed the use of guerrilla tactics in cases they were involved 
in.9 
Despite the existence of such issues, there remains an absence of 
international mechanisms to regulate and reprimand such 
behaviour. There are diverse national ethical rules, which have led 
to an uneven playing field for the parties’ legal representatives, and 
have seen the increased use of ‘guerrilla tactics’ by parties, counsels 
and in some cases, tribunal members in the course of international 
arbitration proceedings. 
The Interplay between Arbitration and Guerrillas 
A definition of any concept is fundamental to its understanding. 
Though many have attempted to define the term, ‘guerrillas’, 
however, the closest approximation to a working definition of 
‘guerrillas’ is,‘not why they fight, […] but how’,10thus, enabling 
them to survive or prevail, in spite of their inferior powers.  
                                                          
8 (The origin of the term guerrilla is Spanish and means a ‘little war’). 
9 Edna Sussman, All's Fair in Love and War – Or is It? The Call for Ethical 
Standards for Counsel in International Arbitration’, for Ethical Standards for 
Counsel in International Arbitration, 7(2) T.D.M. 2 (2010). 
10 ANTHONY JAMES JOES, GUERRILLA WARFARE, 4(Robin Higham ed., 
Westport : Greenwood Press, 1996). 
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The term ‘arbitration guerrilla’ was coined by Michael Hwang in 
2005. For him, the term described those whose aim was ‘to exploit 
the procedural rules for their own advantage, seeking to delay the 
hearing and (if they get any opportunity) ultimately to derail the 
arbitration so that it becomes abortive or ineffective’.11Guerrilla 
tactics in arbitration aim at winning a case or even humiliating the 
other party. 
Günther Horvath considers guerrilla tactics to involve ‘strategies 
employed by parties to arbitration proceedings that are ethical 
violations, involving criminal acts, or ethically borderline 
practices’.12For Edna Sussman, the adoption of ‘strategies, methods 
and tactics, ranging from poor behaviour to egregious and even 
criminal conduct’13, sum up guerrilla tactics. According to Sussman, 
the following behaviour may be identified as ‘guerrilla’ tactics in 
arbitration; unethical practices in document production/disclosure, 
unwarranted delay tactics, creating conflicts, frivolous challenges 
to the arbitrators, last minute surprises, and anti-arbitration 
injunctions. It also includes ex-parte communications, witness 
tampering, lack of respect or courtesy towards members of the 
tribunal and opposing counsel. 
As is evident from the above, this concept, in so far as arbitration is 
concerned, is an amalgamation of various components which are 
too broad to be brought into one strict definition. Guerilla tactics is 
all about behaviour, which may range from blatant measures 
involving illegal or unethical conduct to more subtle, underhand 
manoeuvres. Hence, in order to understand the behaviour, the 
essential elements of these tactics must be understood. These 
elements are deviance, tactics, and intent. 
                                                          
11 MICHAEL HWANG, Why is There Still Resistance to Arbitration in Asia?, 
GLOBAL REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMERCE AND DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION – LIBOR AMORICUM IN HONOUR OF ROBERT BRINER, 401(Gerald 
Aksen et al. eds., ICC Publishing 2005). 
12 Guerrilla Tactics in Arbitration, and Ethical Battle Field: Is There a Need For 
Universal Code of Ethics?AUSTRIAN Y.B. INT’L ARB. 297-313 (Klausegger et 
al. eds. Manz, C.H. Beck, Stämpfli 2011). 
13 Sussman, supra note 11. 
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Guerilla tactics deviate from the conventional scope of law and 
ethics; while it is always unethical, it may not in every instance 
amount to a violation of law or written procedural rules. 
Nonetheless, such behaviour most often constitutes a hindrance to 
arbitral proceedings. The deviance may differ based on the rigidity 
of the norm in question. Accordingly, one can distinguish between 
these types of practices which are (1) ‘common’forms of guerrilla 
tactics, which amount to obvious misconduct, (2) ‘extreme’ 
guerrilla tactics such as severe criminal acts and blatant abuse of 
state authority; and (3) ‘rough riding’ which cannot be categorized 
as guerrilla tactics at all.14 Where exactly the conduct in question 
falls may well be a matter of personal opinion.15 However, the 
proposition that is free of any ambiguity is that guerrilla tactics 
cannot exist in a vacuum, sans any deviance. 
Another element of guerrilla tactics that deserves attention is the 
‘tactical’ element, i.e., the party’s deliberate engagement with the 
action in question, rather than the mere exploitation of coincidences 
or unforeseen developments. For instance, a heated argument at an 
evidentiary hearing that results in an assault, could in certain 
circumstances be regarded as ‘tactical’, if a party deliberately 
executes or provokes the assault.16Presuming that the intent is the 
starting point and the deviance is the finishing line, then the 
‘tactical’ element is a means to that end. The continuous and 
strategic employment of such tactics connotes guerrilla tactics. 
Guerrilla tactics are chosen in cases where the sole intention is to 
obstruct the proceedings or to hinder the other party. Guerrilla 
tactics begin where a party no longer uses these safeguards as a 
shield, but as a weapon to assault the integrity of the arbitral 
proceedings.  A real ‘guerrilla’ is a party who only refers to the 
rules when expedient but is otherwise intent on obstructing, 
delaying, derailing, and/or sabotaging the arbitral proceedings, 
                                                          
14See, Oprisan Fruth Despina, Facing the Reality of Guerrilla Tactics in 
Romania, 7(2) T.D.M. 3-5 (2010). 
15Id. at 20. 
16 Charles Toutant, Arbitrator is Not Liable for Attorney's Alleged Assault of 
Party Court Says, N.J.L.J. 1 (2008); ICC Court Names New Secretary General, 
7(3) G.A.R. 2 (2012). 
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and ultimately attempting to pervert the course of justice in order 
to obtain the desired result. A continuous and systematic use of 
challenges to the arbitrator, such as requests for extension of time 
and the submission of excessive amounts of documents aimed 
solely at obstructing the arbitral proceedings can result in the rules 
being bent to their advantage, and their intended purpose being 
defeated. Therefore, the intent behind a party’s action forms a large 
part of the guerrilla tactics. 
While tracing the evolution of guerrilla tactics in arbitration, it is 
necessary to delve into the possible causes as well, though 
‘causation’ in this instance is merely a better word for an excuse. 
The aim, however, is not to justify the acts but to rather explain 
them. The commercial world prefers arbitration for varied reasons 
such as autonomy, saving of time or even confidentiality. There are 
regulatory frameworks within which arbitration is conducted, 
which are established either by a contract or the arbitral institutions 
concerned. However, some parties do not wish to venture into the 
formal rules of arbitration and this tenders them more susceptible 
to a hostile environment. The aim for any party to arbitration is to 
obtain the award in their favour. In cases of a ‘last resort tactic’, a 
party may attempt to follow the ethical practices at the initial stages 
and subsequently turn to guerrilla tactics. Hence, the initial 
intention of the party is to promote the spirit of arbitration and not 
otherwise.  
Advocacy involves intricate skills such as witness preparation, 
docket creation, and ex-parte communication among others. These 
skills vary from one country to another. The practices relating to 
arbitration followed in multiple jurisdictions are also varied.  For 
instance preparing a witness to the extent of rehearsing his 
testimony is unlawful in Britain; whereas in the United States, 
rehearsal of witness testimony by an advocate is in vogue.17 Thus, a 
practice regularly followed by an American attorney may be 
considered unethical or even ‘guerrilla’ by the British solicitor. In 
this scenario, both the parties intend to uphold the spirit of 
                                                          
17Günther Horvath, How May Commercial Arbitral Tribunals Cope With and 
Sanction Guerrilla Tactics of the Parties/Their Counsel?, 7 (2) T.D.M. 10 (Nov. 
2010). 
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arbitration, but fail on account of the differences in their legal 
cultures. Though a uniform code as a solution to this problem may 
seem to be simple, the creation of such a framework would be at 
the expense of forsaking the state practices of the parties to the 
arbitration. 
Factors that Trigger Guerilla Tactics in International 
Arbitration 
Every party to arbitration makes use of all the resources available 
to it, financial or otherwise. The state has law enforcement 
agencies, intelligence agencies, and land among other things at its 
disposal which most states are not afraid to use. Though this is not 
the general practice, if guerrilla tactics were to be employed with 
these resources, it could be grave. The state can facilitate all this 
under the garb of ‘exercise of sovereign power’.18The most 
susceptible to these tactics are the investment treaty disputes under 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID). 
One of the most valuable features of an arbitration proceeding is 
confidentiality. However, when taken too far it becomes a sufficient 
drawback. The guerrillas thrive in these conditions simply because 
crimes are better effected under the wave of confidentiality. 
However, the importance of confidentiality is such that it eclipses 
any possible precaution in this regard.  
Laws are seldom created which fulfil their intended purpose. The 
problem with arbitration is that sometimes the regulatory 
mechanism leads to the disruption of the system. The provisions 
stipulated for the purposes of creating a fair opportunity to resolve 
the dispute may in fact, result in the hampering of the process. For 
instance, the most widely deployed guerrilla tactic is the act of 
seeking undue adjournments to delay the resolution of disputes. 
These challenges reflect frivolity, lack of rationale and mala fides. 
As these tactics evolve, they also gain a degree of professional 
acceptability. When a tactic is successfully applied to a particular 
                                                          
18 L. Malintoppi, How May Investment Tribunals Cope With and Sanction 
Guerrilla Tactics of the Parties/their Counsel?, 7(No. 2) T.D.M. 4 (Nov. 2010). 
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case, it enters the domain of innovation. At present, most counsels 
believe in a result oriented approach to advocacy, where 
innovation plays a significant role. If an act or omission 
consistently works in arbitral proceedings, it is bound to gain 
acceptability.   
Justification for Guerilla Tactics in International 
Arbitration 
Arbitration guerrillas know that the tribunals will be anxious to be 
seen as fair and properly appreciative of cultural differences, and 
they will therefore try and test this accommodating attitude to the 
maximum by asking for all kinds of indulgences, particularly in 
requests for an extension of deadlines. In local litigation, counsel 
for the other party can often comment on the validity of the reasons 
given in support of the applications for various procedural 
indulgences, and the local court itself judges the validity of these 
reasons. It is much more difficult for non Asian counsels and 
arbitrators to decide on the truth of the reasons advanced by Asian 
parties for their applications. Even if they have suspicions about 
the validity of these reasons and cannot substantiate those 
suspicions in a manner that can speak for itself in their award, they 
would still be fearful of a challenge or defence based on a breach of 
Article 18 of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration or Article V(l)(a) of the Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York 
Convention).19 Michael Hwang has pointed out that such a 
situation is particularly prevalent in arbitration proceedings in 
Asia.20 It is these paradoxes that have worked to rationalise the 
                                                          
19 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards. 1959 330 UNTS 3. 
20 Michael Hwang, Why is There Still Resistance to Arbitration in Asia?, 
Selected essays on International Arbitration, 2013, 25 available at 
http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/downloads/MH_Selected-Essays_on_IA.pdf (last 
visited 30 Jan. 2014). 
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guerrilla tactics, to a large extent, resulting in them gaining general 
acceptability.  
However, Hwang points out that there are substantial number of 
local lawyers who do not wish to appear against foreign lawyers 
before a foreign arbitration tribunal.21They do not intend to 
sabotage arbitration because their clients have no defence, but they 
sincerely believe that their clients will get a better outcome before a 
local court for the following reasons - they are inexperienced in 
international arbitration and are not conversant with the 
proceedings, they feel that their clients may be at greater risk of 
liability because they are less capable of predicting the outcome 
and they believe that their clients’ witnesses may be better believed 
by a local court rather than a tribunal composed of at least a 
majority of foreigners. 
Ethical Regulations in International Arbitration 
Currently, there are no effective mechanisms for the regulation of 
ethics in international arbitration. This is due to two factors; the 
absence of enforceable ethical standards in international arbitration, 
and insufficient powers in the rules of many arbitral institutions to 
deal effectively with the problems as they arise.22 Hence, many 
jurists have raised concerns in this regard with a specific interest on 
the development of an effective global code or guidelines to clearly 
demarcate right and wrong with respect to the behaviour of 
functionaries in arbitration. 
The first attempt to revamp the ethical regulations is traceable to 
the 1990s, when Jan Paulson, severely criticized the state of affairs 
during those times.23Arbitration, as a process, continued to prosper 
                                                          
21 Michael Hwang, Why is There Still Resistance to Arbitration in Asia?, 
Selected essays on International Arbitration, 2013, 27 available at 
http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/downloads/MH_Selected-Essays_on_IA.pdf (last 
visited 30 Jan. 2014). 
22 William W Park, Arbitrations Discontent: Of Elephants and Pornography, 
JOURNAL OF INT’L ARB. 263 (2001). 
23 Jan Paulsson, Standards of Conduct for Counsel in International Arbitration, 
MKM REV. INT'L ARB. 3 214 (1992). 
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despite such a drawback. People were, and still are, appreciative of 
the time effectiveness and autonomy attached to an arbitration 
proceeding. The globalised world has accepted arbitration with its 
ethical conundrums as long as the disputes have been resolved in a 
manner chosen by the parties. The problem has, however 
aggravated since it was not addressed effectively, so much so that 
‘guerrillas’ have now become a recognised defect in arbitration. 
Hence, the remedial measures have now come to the fore. Recently, 
Doak Bishop argued that the lack of clarity as to which ethical rules 
to apply, the existence of conflicting rules and obligations, the non 
transparency and the increased size of many proceedings, 
combined with greater public scrutiny, creates certain instability in 
the system that could result in a future crisis of confidence.24 He 
further argued that the only way to gauge public confidence is 
through a code of conduct which is clear and binding.25 Such a code 
must have some essentials, such as the ability to clarify the 
applicable rules and reduce ambiguity, the ability to create a level 
playing field, and the ability to provide greater transparency. 
The above essentials clearly indicate a concern, though not an 
immediate one. The academicians and professionals should 
understand the threat such an act poses to the future of arbitration 
in the innovative and globalised world. According to Gary Born, a 
renowned expert in arbitration, the best resolution to such concerns 
would be the development of a uniform code of international rules 
of professional conduct, applicable to counsels in international 
arbitration proceedings.26The biggest question over such a 
proposition would be the enforcement of that international legal 
instrument. There are many institutions that may be able to 
perform such a task, efficiently or otherwise, such as bar 
associations, local courts, arbitral institutions or tribunals. It will 
                                                          
24 R. Doak Bishop, Advocacy and Ethics in International Arbitration: Ethics in 
International Arbitration, Arbitration Advocacy in Changing Times, ICCA 
Congress Series No. 15 2010, Rio, 383-390 (Kluwer International Law 
2011). 
25 Id. 
26 GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 2318-2319 
(Alphen aan den Rijn; Kluwer Law International 2009). 
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almost certainly be the arbitral tribunals that will be the best 
equipped to take on such a responsibility. 
The reason why arbitral tribunals would be the most preferred in 
formulating standards of ethical regulation is because of their 
hands on approach. Tribunals ought to reflect ethical regulations in 
international arbitration and unethical practices would often be 
noticed and condemned by the tribunals. However, the extent to 
which such tribunals may exercise their powers is a matter of great 
concernas the powers of the tribunals are decided by the guerrillas 
themselves i.e. the parties. In case of institutional arbitration this is 
largely controlled.  
It is evident from the ICSID decision in Hrvatska Elektroprivreda 
D.D. v. Republic of Slovenia, in which the question was whether the 
tribunal’s authority to bar a party selected counsel from appearing 
before it was based solely on supranational standards of conduct 
for counsel. The law that was established in this case was that there 
exists ‘an inherent power [in a tribunal] to take measures to 
preserve the integrity of its proceedings’.27 Based on the above, the 
tribunal disqualified a British barrister who was not only a member 
of the same chambers as the president of the tribunal, but was also 
added as the respondent’s counsel well after the case had begun, 
and whose involvement was only disclosed before the final 
hearing.28This case, however, seems a bit too radical in its approach 
and if interpreted widely could lead to a lot of problems in the 
future. This position was slightly normalised in the case of 
Rompetrol Group v. Romania,29 where the court indicated that even if 
such powers exist, they are only to be exercised in exceptional and 
rare circumstances. Though we may have established that tribunals 
have the ability to exercise such powers, it is to a limited extent. 
Even if the tribunals decide to exercise this power, they require an 
internationally accepted code of conduct. The world of arbitration 
                                                          
27 Hrvatska Elektroprivreda D.D. v. Republic of Slovenia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/24 (Tribunal's Ruling regarding the participation of David 
Mildon QC in further stages of the proceedings) ¶ 33 (May 6, 2008). 
28 Id. 
29 Rompetrol Group v. Romania, (ICSID Case No.ARB/06/3) Award (May 
6, 2013). 
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has been plagued with multifarious laws of multiple jurisdictions 
which cause a lot of confusion at times. Contrary to popular 
opinion, an internationally accepted code of conduct would help in 
having clarity. Ethics, as previously explained, has largely been an 
ignored area of arbitration. Therefore, an internationally accepted 
code of conduct would reflect a positive step in filling up this 
paucity.  
An attempt in this regard has been made by the International Bar 
Association (IBA) in 2013.30 They framed guidelines on the conduct 
of parties in international arbitration. In this, they have clearly 
demarcated the difference between the ‘right’ and the ‘wrong’ 
behaviour of parties and counsels in international arbitration. 
These guidelines are stimulated by the principle that party 
representatives should act with integrity and honesty and should 
not engage in activities designed to produce unnecessary delay or 
expense, including tactics aimed at obstructing the arbitration 
proceedings.31 
The groundwork for these guidelines was laid down in 2010, when 
the IBA Task Force sent out a broad survey to arbitration 
practitioners concerning counsel ethics in international arbitration. 
The rationale behind the survey was to help in investigating the 
different and often contrasting ethical and cultural norms, 
standards and disciplinary rules that may apply to counsels in 
international arbitration. The survey was encouraged by the view 
that the lack of international guidelines and conflicting norms in 
counsel ethics undermines the fundamental protection of fairness 
and equality of treatment and the integrity of international 
arbitration proceedings.32On the basis of the survey results, a 
                                                          
30 IBA Guidelines on Party Representation in International Arbitration 
(2013) available at http://www.ibanet.org/org/Document/ Default.aspx? 
Documentuid=6FOC57D7-E7A0-43AF-B76E-714D9FE74D7F.  
31 IBA Guidelines on Party Representation in International Arbitration 
(2013) available at 
http://www.ibanet.org/org/Document/Default.aspx?Documentuid=6F
OC57D7-E7A0-43AF-B76E-714D9FE74D7F.  
32 IBA Arbitration Committee Survey (2010), available at 
1.www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=610bbf6e-cf02-45-ae-
8c3a-70dfdb2274a5.  
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working group of the Task Force produced a draft document, in the 
nature of guidelines. These draft guidelines were first reviewed by 
the IBA Arbitration Committee’s Officers and later submitted to all 
members of the Arbitration Committee for consideration.33Finally, 
the IBA Council adopted their guidelines in a resolution on May 25, 
2013.  
Conclusion 
The ethical conundrums have carved a special space in 
international disputes so much so that the entire future of 
arbitration depends largely on the ethical and procedural viability 
of the available checks and balances. This is due to the fact that 
such ethical issues determine the credibility of arbitral procedures. 
Just like any other service, the credibility establishes the longevity. 
Likewise, only if we produce an environment that is conducive to a 
fair process to both the parties, can we ensure a future for 
international arbitration. 
Though the major opposition to arbitration comes because of the 
existing or perceived time and cost inefficiencies, another criticism 
that is to be levelled against arbitration is the perceived lack of 
transparency and legitimacy of the system as a whole. Further, we 
see that the recent global financial crisis has aggravated the 
tendency of dishonest parties to resort to unethical or illegal means 
of achieving their goals.34 
Although the guerrilla tactics in international arbitration have come 
to be recognized, we are yet to see a regulatory change that 
accommodates the ethical overhaul that is required to meet the 
changes in arbitration proceedings. We must concede, however, 
that in the arbitral community today, we have a substantial number 
                                                          
33 IBA Arbitration Committee Survey (2010), available at 
1.www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=610bbf6e-cf02-45-ae-
8c3a-70dfdb2274a5 at 9. 
34 Cf. Michael Walzer, Coda: Can the Good Guys Win?, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 444 
(2013): (who argues in the context of asymmetrical warfare that the rules, 
rightly understood, are consistent with military success but that it is 
important that public opinion is shaped by the right understanding so that 
just conduct is recognized and reinforced). 
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of elites who subscribe to the proposition that there is no rule in 
international arbitration.35 It is evident, therefore, that the ethical 
organ of arbitration is yet to evolve and is presently in a period of 
transition. Though such behaviour is recognized and rightly 
condemned, the legal treatment of such a situation still remains 
controversial.  
                                                          
35 Stephan Wilske & Martin Raible, The Arbitrator as Guardian of 
International Public Policy? Should Arbitrators Go Beyond Solving Legal 
Issues?, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION, 249, 263 (Catherine 
A. Rogers & Roger P. Alford eds., Oxford University Press, 2009). 
